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This paper examines whether recent international policy initiatives to
facilitate ﬁnancial rescues in emerging market countries have inﬂuenced
debtors’ incentives to access oﬃcial sector resources. We highlight the sys-
temic importance of countries as a key characteristic driving access to oﬃ-
cial sector ﬁnance and estimate the eﬀect of the policy initiatives on IMF
programme participation using a pooled probit model. The safety net im-
plied by policy changes to permit exceptional access is shown to have a
greater marginal impact on oﬃcial sector resource usage, the more systemi-
cally important the debtor. Our results can be interpreted as oﬀering some
support for the presence of debtor-side moral hazard.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F33, F34.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, International Lending, Financial Crises.
21. Introduction
The recent debate on the ‘international ﬁnancial architecture’ has highlighted
the potential moral hazard implications of large oﬃcial sector ﬁnancial rescues of
emerging market economies. Concern that the increased scale of IMF-led bailouts
may distort debtor and creditor incentives, generating excessive borrowing and
lending, has led to calls for clearly deﬁned limits to oﬃcial support and greater
private sector involvement in crisis resolution.1 As Table 1 shows, the size of rescue
packages has risen substantially relative to the economies involved. Financing
arrangements agreed between the IMF and debtor countries were of the order of
6% of GDP during the ﬁnancial crises since the mid-nineties, compared with some
1.5% of GDP during the debt problems of the early eighties.
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of credit purchases from the IMF’s General
Resources Account (GRA) through programmes involving conditionality. The av-
erage annual purchase of those countries accessing such resources has risen sharply
to almost $2.5bn in 2002, from around $150mn in the early eighties.2 But, when
the prominent crisis economies of the nineties are excluded, purchases of IMF
1Mathieson et.al (2000) provide a comprehensive review of this debate. See also Haldane &
Kruger (2001), and Krueger (2002).
2In real terms, average purchases have returned to levels seen at the peak of the early eighties
debt crisis.
3credit display a more benign pattern. As Figure 2 shows, there has also been a gen-
eral rise in the relative scale of resource usage. Purchases of IMF GRA resources,
as a percentage of the total GDP of those countries accessing credit tranches, rose
in the nineties after being broadly stable during the previous twenty years. The
greater use of oﬃcial sector funds by a relatively small number of countries belies
the view that the large size of recent rescues reﬂects a general rise in real hazard
due to the greater integration of emerging market economies into international
capital markets.3
The increased scale of oﬃcial sector packages has been made possible by several
policy decisions that altered both the size of the IMF’s total ﬁnancial resources
a n dt h ea m o u n ti tc o u l dl e n dt oe a c hm e m b e r .I nt h ew a k eo ft h eM e x i c a nc r i s i s ,
concerns that increased resources might be needed to respond to capital account
crises prompted industrial countries to initiate the New Arrangements to Borrow
(NAB) in January 1997 to supplement existing IMF resources. Shortly afterwards,
in December 1997, a Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) was introduced to pro-
vide emergency large scale short-term ﬁnancing in the event of a capital account
crisis.4 Lane & Phillips (2000) note that if debtors and creditors perceived these
3Mussa (1999) discusses the real hazards facing such countries in their interactions with the
global ﬁnancial system.
4A brief description of the main IMF facilities is oﬀered in the Appendix.
4measures to be regularising access to exceptional funding above normal limits,
then an increase in moral hazard (and resource usage) might be expected.5 But
there has been little formal work to examine whether the ‘international ﬁnancial
safety net’ established by these policy changes has inﬂuenced debtors’ reliance on
oﬃcial sector resources.6
Empirical tests for the presence of moral hazard have been the subject of
much attention in the literature on health and labour economics.7 These micro-
econometric studies suggest that incentive eﬀects of contracts (i.e. moral hazard)
are, in general, easiest to detect when there are exogenous changes in the incentive
structure, and when the populations involved do not change. Such natural exper-
iments typically arise when there are distinct changes in government policies and
regulations but, on their own, only establish simultaneity rather than causality.8
To distinguish only those agents whose incentives are inﬂuenced by a regulatory
change, samples are split into a ‘test’ group that is aﬀected by the experiment and
a ‘control’ group that is not. The estimated eﬀe c to fp o l i c yo ni n c e n t i v e si st h e n
5Consistent with this view, some commentators (Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, 2001; Mussa, 2002)
suggest that large-scale oﬃcial ﬁnancing can generate moral hazard ‘indirectly’ by encouraging
inappropriate domestic policies in emerging market economies.
6See Haldane & Taylor (2003), for example, for a review of the literature.
7See, for example, Chiappori et.al, (1998), Blundell & MaCurdy (1999), and Chiappori &
Salanie (2000).
8So, for instance, a change in health regulation could coincide with a cold winter, the latter
resulting in increased demand for medical services.
5inferred from the diﬀerence in the outcomes for these two groups. This technique
is known as diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation.
Two factors prevent direct application of the natural experiment approach to
the issue of a debtor’s reliance on oﬃcial sector ﬁnances. First, the creation of an
international safety net was a purposeful action by the oﬃcial sector in response to
a set of turbulent economic and ﬁnancial circumstances. In other words, the policy
change was not exogenous. This makes it necessary to identify and control for
factors that drive potential access to the safety net created by the SRF and NAB.
Second, oﬃcial actions were not restricted ex ante to a speciﬁc group of countries
so, unlike most natural experiment studies, an explicit control group cannot be
identiﬁed. Blundell & MaCurdy (1999) and Besley & Case (2000) argue that,
in order to surmount these issues, a suitably deﬁned instrumental variable that
explicitly captures policy decisions must be constructed.
This paper examines how IMF programme participation has varied with policy
measures designed to facilitate ﬁnancial rescues. We argue that the SRF and
NAB were designed to contain the systemic impact of capital account crises. This
suggests that the resultant safety net might have a greater impact on incentives,
the more likely is a country to receive funding under these measures — i.e. the more
‘systemic’ the country. We therefore construct an index of systemic importance
6to instrument for the factors driving policy decisions. It allows us to sidestep the
problem of policy endogeneity and the need for a well-deﬁned control group. Our
analysis thus explores how observed changes in programme participation vary with
the systemic importance of a country (as appropriately deﬁned) using a pooled
probit model across the period 1995—2001.
Our probit model provides a link to the empirical literature on the economic
determinants of IMF programmes. Speciﬁcally, we draw on the insights of Joyce
(1992), Knight & Santaella (1997), IMF (2001b) and Barro & Lee (2002) to iden-
tify the key economic variables inﬂuencing access to IMF credit. Ideally, a struc-
tural model of demand- and supply-side factors would be used in this identiﬁcation
process. However, for reasons of empirical tractability, a reduced-form model is
the preferred approach in the literature.
In drawing on lessons from the natural experiment methodology, we introduce
an innovation to the existing empirical literature and a diﬀerent approach to the
intrinsic identiﬁcation problems faced in such studies of moral hazard induced by
IMF lending. A ﬁrst generic identiﬁcation issue faced by empirical studies of moral
hazard is how to measure changes in agents’ behaviour. Most previous studies,
such as Dell’Ariccia et.al (2002), Haldane & Scheibe (2003), Kamin (2002), and
7Zhang (1999), use asset prices as the dependent variable.9 However, asset prices
are, at best, an indirect measure of changes in agents’ incentive structures. In
contrast, by focusing on a country’s usage of IMF resources, we identify a directly
observable action as the dependent variable. A second identiﬁcation problem is
how to disentangle empirically the eﬀects of IMF policies on the likelihood of real
hazard from their eﬀects on moral hazard. This question is particularly pertinent
to studies employing forward-looking asset prices which could respond to both
eﬀects. A third identiﬁcation concern is whether the potential moral hazard events
which are analysed are truly exogenous. Dell’Ariccia et.al (2002) and Haldane &
Scheibe (2003) provide diﬀerent approaches to this issue in relation to the use of
major credit events as ‘policy experiments’ in asset price studies. Our approach
is to model explicitly, through the use of a systemic index as an instrument, the
determinants of policy before estimating its incidence.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines our methodology
and describes the data. Section 3 presents and interprets the results. A ﬁnal
section concludes.
9See also McBrady & Seasholes (2000), and Lane & Phillips (2000).
82. Empirical Framework
2.1. Access to oﬃcial sector ﬁnance
We regard the introduction of the SRF and NAB as measures that marked a
shift in the oﬃcial sector response to capital account crises. The realisation that
the management of such crises needed substantial resources prompted the major
industrial countries to develop ways of supplementing existing IMF programmes
to countries facing balance of payments diﬃculties. Both the SRF and NAB
embody an ex ante expectation that the availability of oﬃcial resources would
be dependent on a members’ characteristics. The SRF was likely ‘to be utilized
in cases where the magnitude of the outﬂows may create a risk of contagion
that could pose a potential threat to the international monetary system’.10 And
participants in the NAB agreed ‘to make loans to the IMF when supplementary
resources are needed to forestall or cope with an impairment of the international
monetary system, or to deal with an exceptional situation that poses a threat to
10Section 1(b), Use of Fund’s Resources, Supplemental Reserve Facility and Contingent Credit
Lines, IMF (2001a). The SRF has features akin to those of a domestic lender of last resort (see
Appendix Table A.3 for further details), including short maturity terms and surcharges on the
rate of interest for exceptional lending to limit moral hazard. However, whether the latter eﬀect
is suﬃcient is questionable. For example it could be argued that “[S]ince SRF resources are
provided at a time when access to capital markets is essentially cut oﬀ, the rate of charge on
SRF resources is still much lower than the (presumably extremely high) rate the markets would
charge, if credit from the markets were available at all in such situations” (IMF, 2000).
9the stability of the system.’11
The focus on the need to limit contagion suggests that the likelihood of access
to oﬃcial resources under these facilities depends, in the main, on the systemic
importance of a country.12 In other words, the oﬃcial sector decision to provide
a safety net can be described as:
Pit = f(λi,t−1) (2.1)
where Pit is a binary policy decision variable, and λi,t−1 is a measure of the
systemic importance of country i lagged one quarter to reﬂect delays in data
availability.
The advent of measures explicitly designed to facilitate ﬁnancial rescues of
systemically important countries can be expected to inﬂuence the incentive struc-
tures of debtors. The introduction of the NAB and SRF should have a greater
eﬀect on resource usage the more systemic the country. Moreover, both initia-
tives satisfy two requirements that Dell’Ariccia et.al (2002) argue are central to
the natural experiment approach. First, they were events with the potential to
11IMF Press Release 97/5, ‘IMF Adopts a Decisions on New Arrangements to Borrow’, 27
January 1997.
12Factors such as a country’s economic performance which also inﬂuence access to IMF re-
sources are considered separately in our analysis.
10change expectations of the extent and nature of future crisis lending. And second,
they were events unlikely to lead to a reassessment of risks other than through
expectations of a future bailout.
2.2. Econometric model
We suppose that the IMF participation decision of country i at time t, Iit,i sa
binary variable which equals one if the country is in an IMF arrangement (SBA,
EFF or SRF) and draws upon those funds at some point during the programme.
Iit is zero otherwise. This well-deﬁned action avoids the complexities, inherent
in existing studies of IMF lending and moral hazard, posed by the use of asset
prices to infer changes in agents’ incentive structures. We follow other studies
examining access to IMF credit in using a probit model (e.g. Knight & Santaella,
1997, Barro & Lee, 2002). We analyse the incidence of a debtor country’s claims
on IMF resources by invoking a latent variable, I∗
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0
k]Xik,t−1 + εit. (2.2)
11This speciﬁcation can be viewed as a reduced form model that reﬂects both the
demand and the supply of IMF loans, a fact which must be borne in mind when
interpreting the coeﬃcients (see Section 3.2). The vector, Xik,t−1,d e n o t e st h ek
country-speciﬁc economic fundamentals that inﬂuence a country’s decision to seek,
or the IMF’s decision to oﬀer, assistance. Dt is a temporal dummy that equals one
in the period following the announcement of the SRF/NAB. Policy following the
safety net is described by Pi,t. Following Knight & Santaella (1997), we use lagged
values of Xik and λi to address possible simultaneity issues (for example, the fact
a country is in a programme might aﬀect its ratings). The lags also help account
for gaps between programme implementation and the availability of information
about the debtor.
From (2.1), we use the systemic index as an instrument for the policy deci-
sion. It is exogenous to the participation decision and uncorrelated with Xik,t−1.13
13The components of the index (see Appendix Table A2) may depend on lagged values of the
fundamentals. However, we reject correlation between contemporaneous values of λi and the
Xik for the fundamental variables in the base model speciﬁcation of Table 6 - a regression of
the former on the latter is insignﬁcant. Using a Rivers-Vuong test, we also reject endogeneity
of the lagged systemic index when it is added to this reduced model.
12Substituting this instrument into (2.2) gives
I
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So the decision rule that determines whether a country has entered a pro-










Equation (2.3) decomposes the constant and marginal coeﬃcient terms into a
number of components.14 The coeﬃcient α0 reﬂects the probability of programme
participation across the whole time period that is due to the debtor’s systemic
characteristics; 4α represents the general structural shift in the probability of
participation following the policy event; and 4α0 reﬂects any additional shift,
post-policy, conditioning for the systemic nature of the country. The coeﬃcients
14The discussion below is framed in terms of the coeﬃcients as the marginal eﬀect. This is
for ease of exposition since, in the nonlinear probit model, the coeﬃcients do not necessarily
indicate the marginal eﬀect of the fundamentals. The marginal eﬀect in the probit model
is ∂Φ
∂(xk) = Φ(Xβ)βk, and our results indicate this marginal eﬀect calculated at the means.
13β
0
k, 4βk,a n d4β
0
k analogously decompose the sensitivity of programme partici-
pation to fundamentals, Xik,t−1.
2.2.1. Hypothesis tests
If the SRF and NAB increase moral hazard then the more systemic the country,
the less sensitive is the debtor’s IMF programme participation decision to fun-
damentals. Notice that, given the reduced form of Equation (2.3), the observed
sensitivity of programme participation to fundamentals could also reﬂect supply-
side incentives, ie the sensitivity to fundamentals of the IMF’s decision to oﬀer a
programme. So our null hypothesis of moral hazard has two necessary, but not
suﬃcient, conditions:
• There is a change in incentives, following the policy measure, in proportion
to the systemic importance of the economy, ie 4β
0
k 6=0 ;
• This change in incentives is such that it is in the reverse direction of any a
priori economic relationship between fundamentals and programme partic-
ipation. For example, we might expect ap r i o r ithat a country with a lower
reserve coverage of short-term debt would be more likely to seek IMF assis-
tance. But under the null of moral hazard, the opposite incentives occur.
14Post policy change, movements in the sensitivity to fundamentals condi-
tioned on the systemic nature of the economy should suggest that partici-
pation is associated with stronger fundamentals (higher reserve coverage).
Although the ﬁrst condition can be tested formally, the second must be exam-
ined for each individual control variable and depends on the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients. The null hypothesis does not place restrictions on whether there are
structural changes post-policy (4α 6=0 , 4α0 6=0 ), or whether there is a general
change in incentives post-policy (4βk 6=0 ). A more restrictive null would be to
test whether any structural or incentive changes post-policy are only in proportion




We use a balanced panel of quarterly observations on 19 middle-to-lower income
developing countries over the period 1995Q1-2001Q4 (see Table 2). These coun-
tries are drawn from the major emerging market asset price indices (the Morgan
Stanley equity index and the JP Morgan EMBIG bond index) and so have access
to private external ﬁnance. The sample is limited owing to restrictions on data
availability for the transition economies. Nonetheless, the countries are broadly
similar in terms of their economic development (as indicated by income per capita
15and trade openness) and integration into international capital markets. They also
account, on average, for more than half of all IMF credit outstanding during the
period in question.
2.3.1. Systemic importance
Empirical and theoretical studies of contagion suggest the risk of contagion is
likely to be greater the more important a country is in international capital mar-
kets, the larger the international bank exposure to the country, and the greater
its importance in international trade.15 We therefore construct a ‘systemic index’
comprising the relative size of a country’s outstanding international debt securi-
ties, BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims on the country, and total trade.16 The
average values for this index (which is bounded by zero and one) and its compo-
nents are shown in Appendix Table A2. The ranking obtained, which is relatively
stable over time, appears consistent with other recent analyses (e.g. Kamin, 2002).
15Although the exact deﬁnition of the interlinkage varies, trade and ﬁnancial channels have
been widely tested in the contagion literature. For example, Kaminsky & Reinhart (2001) con-
sider trade linkages (bilateral and via third markets) and ﬁnancial linkages (via bank exposures
and capital market correlations).
16The components and equal weightings applied in this index and its linear construction are
open to debate. But the index does capture key ﬁnancial and trade propagation mechanisms.
We do not consider explicit geopolitical indicators (although clearly there may be a correlation
between such indicators and our choice of instrument). Barro & Lee (2002) examine the impact
of such indicators on IMF lending decisions.
162.3.2. The endogenous variable
The dependent variable is a binary (0 − 1) index that takes the value one if a
country is under an IMF programme (SBA, EFF or SRF) in any quarter and
makes drawings upon IMF resources during the arrangement. Table 3 provides
summary statistics of the IMF programmes (SBA, EFF or SRF), focusing on
changes post-SRF. The size of funds agreed relative to quota appear to increase
sharply, following the introduction of the SRF. The average programme duration
also appears to lengthen somewhat. For illustrative purposes we include statistics
for two sub-samples, broadly deﬁn e da sm o r eo rl e s ss y s t e m i cr e l a t i v et ot h e
median value of the country average index over time. Both sub-samples experience
similar proportional changes, post-SRF, in terms of the average and maximum
programme sizes relative to quota. In absolute terms, the increases are much
larger for the more systemic sub-sample however.
Table 4 provides summary statistics on country participation in IMF pro-
grammes. In the seven year period there were 176 quarterly programme partic-
ipations. The average number of participations per country per quarter shows
as o m e w h a td i ﬀerent pattern across our two illustrative sub-samples. The fre-
quency of programme participation rises, on average, following the SRF for the
more systemic countries. The same does not appear to be the case for the rest of
17the sample.
2.3.3. Exogenous variables
The incidence of claims on IMF resources depends, to a large extent, on domes-
tic economic conditions and external vulnerabilities. We follow the literature on
the determinants of sovereign spreads and IMF arrangements (e.g. Joyce, 1992;
Knight & Santaella, 1997) and choose variables that inﬂuence the demand and
supply of IMF loans (see Table 5). A country’s demand for IMF resources is likely
to depend on variables such as real GDP growth, inﬂation, the extent of real eﬀec-
tive exchange rate (REER) misalignment, the level of indebtedness and the cost
of alternative ﬁnancing.17 On the supply side, the approval of an arrangement is
likely to depend, in part, on credit growth and the ﬁscal stance. The incidence of
credit disbursal also relates to exchange rate policy — a devaluation is either a prior
action of a programme or a reason for IMF support. Given that absolute ratings
are likely to be correlated with the above variables, following Dell’Ariccia et.al
(2002), we also include the residual of a regression of credit ratings against other
country fundamentals. This summary variable potentially incorporates informa-
17Changes in the cost of alternative ﬁnancing could reﬂect changes in incentives through
creditor moral hazard raising the possibility of endogeneity. However, as discussed below, this
variable is insigniﬁcant in our speciﬁcation and does not test positive for endogeneity if included
i nt h eb a s em o d e l .




We follow the pooled probit approach used in previous empirical studies of IMF
programme participation decisions (e.g. Knight and Santaella, 1997) and in the
currency crisis and early warning system literatures (e.g. Eichengreen et.al, 1996).
Since the approach ignores the panel nature of the data (and yields consistent,
but ineﬃcient, estimators) we use robust errors ‘clustered’ by country.18 This
allows for correlation within country observations, for example due to omitted
country-speciﬁc characteristics.19 Ignoring such correlation would result in under-
estimation of standard errors rendering our hypothesis testing inaccurate.
In order to identify the exogenous variables to be included in the speciﬁcation





We therefore use Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by country (see Rogers, 1993).
Clustering by individuals is widely used in labour economics, and clustering by country has
been employed in some studies of currency crises (see Esquivel & Larraín, 1998) and of IMF
programme participation (see Barro & Lee, 2002).
19We retain the assumption of independence across observations on diﬀerent countries. We
also estimated the model using a random eﬀects panel approach which allows for unobserved
country-speciﬁce ﬀects. But the estimated coeﬃcients from this model were not stable to the
quadrature speciﬁcation of the numerical integration technique. As Greene (2000, p. 837)
emphasises, the probit model does not lend itself to the alternative ﬁxed eﬀects panel approach.
19of Equation 2.3 we ﬁrst estimated a basic pooled probit model that excludes
the variables relating to the policy measures and systemic importance (see Table
6). The full set of independent variables is jointly signiﬁcant. The signs of the
coeﬃcients for reserve coverage of short-term debt, ﬁscal balance, GDP growth and
liquidity variables are as expected — a lower reserve coverage, lower ﬁscal surplus,
lower growth, and tighter external ﬁnancing conditions all increase the likelihood
of a country participating in an IMF programme. One might also expect a weaker
export position, higher domestic price inﬂation and large nominal depreciation
to increase the probability of a country entering an IMF programme. But the
estimated coeﬃcients on these variables were of the opposite sign.20
The signs of the other remaining variables, real domestic credit growth, the
ratings residual and the deviation of the real exchange rate from trend, are open
to interpretation. Although a rapid expansion of credit could create banking sec-
tor stress and precipitate a crisis, it could also reﬂect a deepening of the domestic
ﬁnancial sector which may reduce reliance on external ﬁnance. Similarly, whilst
20T h es i g no ft h e s ec o e ﬃcients could reﬂect some endogeneity. For instance, the presence of a
programme could be associated with a restoration of export growth and reduction in inﬂation.
However, the signs remain the same with lags of up to six quarters and if we add these variables
individually back into our reduced speciﬁcation of Table 6 we reject their endogeneity. Inter-
estingly, Barro & Lee (2002) look explicitly at the impact of IMF lending on country growth
and ﬁnd that the contemporaneous relationship is insigniﬁcant but that there is a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀe c to ng r o w t hi nt h en e x tﬁve year period.
20ratings residuals could reﬂect some form of ratings error conditioned on funda-
mentals, they may also represent additional indicators of creditworthiness and we
would expect a negative coeﬃcient. The estimate obtained in Table 6 is consis-
tent with this view, though the caveat must be borne in mind. If deviations of
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ef r o mt r e n da r ed r i v e nb yp r i v a t ec a p i t a lﬂows, then an
over-valuation may imply little need for international ﬁnancial support. Likewise,
if deviations are below trend and a programme is initiated following downward
pressure on the exchange rate, we might expect a negative coeﬃcient. This is
supported by graphical inspection and borne out by the estimates of Table 6. We,
therefore, take this as our base interpretation.21
The coeﬃcient estimates for real GDP growth, ﬁscal balance, inﬂation, ex-
change rate dummy, real domestic credit growth variables were found to be jointly
insigniﬁcant at the 5% level. Sequential elimination of these variables produces
t h ec o r em o d e l ,t h eﬁt of which is broadly comparable with the univariate speci-
ﬁcation of Knight & Santaella. Importantly, all the supply-side variables used by
Knight & Santaella are insigniﬁcant in our speciﬁcation suggesting that the key
21A real exchange rate overvaluation could also indicate the potential for future exchange rate
corrections and could encourage a debtor to seek IMF support. This suggests that a positive
coeﬃcient is also plausible. But our sample evidence suggests that such countries do not actually
seek to draw on oﬃcial resources, so we regard our base interpretation as being more in keeping
with our deﬁnition of participation.
21fundamental variables that explain IMF participation are largely on the demand
side.
We insert the fundamental variables identiﬁed by the core model into the
speciﬁcation of Equation 2.3 to examine the eﬀects of the SRF (see Table 7). The
ﬁt of the model is improved relative to the core model and the coeﬃcients are
jointly signiﬁcant.22 The signiﬁcance of 4α suggests that there has been a gen-
eral upward shift in the probability of programme participation for all countries,
following the introduction of the SRF. There does not appear to be a signiﬁcant
change in the probability of programme participation solely due to the systemic
nature of a country (with α0 and 4α0 insigniﬁcant). But, across the whole pe-
riod, the interaction coeﬃcients of fundamentals with the systemic index (β
0
k)a r e
jointly signiﬁcant, suggesting that there was a diﬀerence in incentives related to
t h es y s t e m i cn a t u r eo fe c o n o m i e s .
The results in Table 7 suggest that the ﬁrst element in our moral hazard test is
satisﬁed — the coeﬃcients 4β
0
k are jointly signiﬁcant — there has been a change in
incentives post-policy proportional to the systemic nature of the country. There
is also support for the second element of the hypothesis. The ap r i o r idirection
22The accuracy ratio under the moral hazard speciﬁcation is 77.3% and the adjusted pseudo
R2 is 0.257 compared to 73.7% and 0.171 respectively under our core model.
22of the relationship between fundamentals and participation is reversed for both
reserve coverage and the real eﬀective exchange rate coeﬃcient. Post-SRF, the
more systemic the country the more reserve coverage becomes positively related to
IMF programme participation, ie the opposite of our ap r i o r irelationship.23 The
marginal REER coeﬃcient is also opposite to our ap r i o r iassumption — smaller
misalignments of the real exchange rate make participation in IMF programmes
by systemic countries more likely. The coeﬃcients on the ratings residuals have a
more ambiguous interpretation and do not indicate a signiﬁcant change in incen-
tives in the post-SRF period. Our estimates suggest that, for reserve coverage in
particular, resource usage by more systemic countries is in the opposite direction
to the general trend.24
We repeated the above analysis using the announcement of the NAB in 1997
Q1 as the key policy event. The eﬀects on resource usage were expected to be
similar to those arising from the introduction of the SRF. The test results, both
23This might reﬂect the rise in reserve coverage in Asia post-crisis which was concurrent
with the presence of a number of more systemic Asian countries being in an IMF programme.
But estimating the model excluding the Asian crisis economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand) produced the same results.
24Furthermore this eﬀect appears to be of signiﬁcant relative magnitude (as calculated by the
marginal eﬀect at the means). Post-SRF, for a given reserve cover, the marginal eﬀe c ta tt h e
mean suggests that a country with a systemic index of 0.25 would be 30% more likely to be in
a programme than a country with a systemic index of zero. This eﬀect compares to a general
fall in the probability of programme participation post-SRF, for given reserve cover, of around
40%.
23in terms of the signiﬁcance of 4β
0
k and the direction of the fundamental variables
of reserve coverage and real eﬀective exchange rate deviation, were the same as in
the SRF case.
Another candidate for a policy event is the Russian crisis (1998 Q3). Dell’Ariccia
et.al (2002) suggest that the IMF’s decision not to intervene reduced expectations
of future bailouts, casting doubts over the ‘international ﬁnancial safety net’. Our
results are again unchanged when we estimate our model using this event. There
is a general upward shift in the probability of entering a programme in the period
from 1998Q3, and systemically important countries appear to have acted as if a
ﬁnancial safety net was present. In other words, the Russian non-bailout did not
lower the propensity for systemic countries to use oﬃcial sector resources. But
the lack of sensitivity of our results to changes in events could reﬂect the similar
time periods involved (each event roughly divides the sample into periods before
and after late 1997/1998). It could also reﬂect limitations in our policy equation,
which depends only on the degree of systemic importance. Clearly other factors
were also relevant — a fuller analysis would require a richer set of indicators to ex-
plain the reasons for the non-intervention of the oﬃcial sector during the Russian
crisis.
We also examined the sensitivity of our results to the structural speciﬁcation,
24for example the choice of lags and systemic index deﬁnition. Using the same
variables as in Table 7, if the lag is varied from zero to four quarters the core
results remain: 4α, 4βk and 4β
0
k are signiﬁcant (at least at the 10% level) and
the reserve cover coeﬃcient is positive in 4β
0
k and negative in 4βk. However,
for lags of more than two quarters the sign of the real eﬀective exchange rate
coeﬃcient diﬀers to the base results.25 The core results also hold if we use a
dichotomous systemic index (deﬁned as one for a country if its average systemic
index was above the sample median and zero otherwise). Similarly for systemic
indices based solely on shares of foreign claims or international debt securities.
The results do not hold if we use an index based solely on the trade shares. This
is perhaps unsurprising as this variable appears a less valid instrument for the
policy decision given the lower risk of contagion of international capital markets
through trade ﬂows alone.
3.2. Interpretation
Careful interpretation of our reduced form model results is required — changes in
programme participation could reﬂect changes in the supply-side incentives for
25However, the signiﬁcance levels of these individual coeﬃcients falls. In part this is likely
to reﬂect the fact that these variables were chosen from a base speciﬁcation using a single lag.
If we identify the appropriate fundamental variables for diﬀerent lags again our core results of
joint signiﬁcance of the groups of coeﬃcients and signing of the reserve cover coeﬃcient remain.
25the IMF to lend, changes in the demand-side incentives of potential borrowers
or a combination of the two. Only changes in demand-side incentives could be
related to potential debtor moral hazard. Given this identiﬁcation problem, one
would ideally estimate a structural model of both the demand- and supply-side of
IMF programme participation. If one is to follow this approach, which variables
should be incorporated in the supply-side of such a model?
Some guidance may be provided by an IMF study of the empirical impor-
tance of diﬀerent existing access criteria (IMF, 2001b). These criteria included
a perceived need for Fund resources (the demand-side) and various supply-side
variables, for example the borrower’s capacity to repay, its track record in pre-
vious programmes and its stock of outstanding Fund credit relative to its quota.
An u m b e ro fﬁnancial and “strength of programme” variables were used as in-
dicators of the capacity to repay. The signiﬁcant supply-side variables were the
level of outstanding Fund credit at the beginning of the arrangement relative to
e x p o r t s( v i e w e da saﬁnancial indicator of the capacity to repay), the projected
current account adjustment (a “strength of programme” indicator of the capacity
to repay) and the presence of a poor track record in previous programmes. Incor-
porating these variables into our study is problematic. This reﬂects not only data
availability but also the fact that each one of these variables is deﬁned only at
26the start of a programme and hence are not amenable to the time-series dimen-
sion in our dataset. So, reﬂecting the conclusions of Knight & Santaella (1997),
the use of a structural model presents a trade-oﬀ between analytical rigour and
empirical tractability. In the light of this trade-oﬀ our choice remains the reduced
form model, which is the preferred model of the related literature on the economic
determinants of IMF programmes.
The fundamental variables in our ﬁnal reduced form model — reserve coverage,
real exchange rate appreciation and a residual indicator of creditworthiness (the
ratings residual variable) — are all indicators of a debtor’s potential need for Fund
resources. Furthermore, they are consistent with those variables identiﬁed in
previous studies (Knight & Santaella, 1997, and IMF, 2001b) as indicators of the
demand for Fund resources. This suggests that our results are indeed picking up
changes in demand-side incentives that are required to validate our moral hazard
hypothesis tests.26
26Indeed the IMF study (IMF, 2001b) concluded that the relatively small explanatory power
of indicators of existing access criteria and the importance of the constant term “suggests the
existence of an implicit norm for access” (p. 25). This could be viewed as adding weight to
the interpretation of our reduced-form model as picking up primarily changes in demand-side
incentives.
274. Concluding Remarks
This paper has speciﬁed and estimated a probit model in an attempt to identify
whether recent policy measures to facilitate international ﬁnancial rescues have
inﬂuenced debtors’ reliance on oﬃcial sector resources. To the extent that these
measures may lead certain debtors to view exceptional funding as ‘part of the
furniture’, an increase in moral hazard might be expected. Our analysis high-
lights the systemic importance of debtors as a key characteristic driving access
to exceptional funds. Using an index of systemic importance as an instrument
for the policy decision to extend such funds we estimate the incidence of IMF
programme participation. In adapting the natural experiment methodology of
the labour and health economics literature on moral hazard, our approach aims
to avoid potential problems of endogeneity and the lack of well-deﬁned control
groups. Combined with the use of directly observable actions to gauge the degree
of moral hazard, this methodology provides an innovation to the previous, asset
price-based, literature and an alternative attempt to address some of the inherent
identiﬁcation problems of such empirical studies of moral hazard.
The initial empirical results obtained from our simple set-up are suggestive.
We ﬁnd that the introduction of the NAB and SRF has a greater impact on
28incentives for oﬃcial sector resource usage, the more systemically important the
debtor, ie the more likely an economy is to beneﬁt from the safety net created
by these measures. The results appear particularly robust in relation to reserve
coverage (which conceptually seems to be a primary driver of a debtor’s incentives
to access oﬃcial sector resources). A potential problem, however, is the diﬃculty of
distinguishing between supply- and demand-side inﬂuence on observed behaviour.
Whilst this could suggest that the ﬁndings might also be consistent with a change
in IMF supply-side incentives as well as moral hazard, our estimates, and the
related literature, point to the importance of demand-side factors in explaining
the participation decision. The ﬁndings could thus be interpreted as oﬀering some
support for an increase in the degree of moral hazard on the debtor-side during
the late nineties. But this should not be taken as deﬁnitive evidence of IMF-
induced moral hazard. As Rogoﬀ (2002) notes empirical studies of moral hazard
in international lending are extremely mixed and best viewed with caution. A
fuller analysis must directly analyse the behaviour of both borrowers and lenders,
as international capital ﬂows reﬂect the interaction of both types of agent.
Some other limitations of our study must also be kept in mind before drawing
any policy implications. First, our results conﬁrm a necessary, but not suﬃcient
condition for debtor-side moral hazard. Second, our inability to identify a control
29group necessitates the use of an instrumental variable, the choice of which is open
to debate. Third, in contrast to other natural experiment analyses of moral hazard
in the insurance or labour economics literature, our dataset is relatively small and
this limits the econometric methodology which can be employed. Finally, the
common ﬁnding across diﬀerent policy events may reﬂect some broader structural
change to debtor incentives that occurred during the late nineties.
Our ﬁndings should not be taken to mean that measures such as the SRF have
no place in crisis management policy. The desirability and extent of an ‘interna-
tional ﬁnancial safety net’ involve trading oﬀ the ex ante problems of moral hazard
against the ex post costs of crisis. But our results provide some support to those
who argue that oﬃcial ﬁnance can distort the incentives of debtors and, poten-
tially, substitute for private capital ﬂows. Limits to oﬃcial ﬁnance may, therefore
be justiﬁable. As in many other instances, policies towards crisis management
must aim to strike a balance — between oﬃcial ﬁnance, debtor adjustment, and
private sector involvement.
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34A. IMF facilities and construction of a systemic index
A.1. IMF facilities
The main IMF facilities are described in Table A1 below.









Objective  Address short-term 
balance of payments 
difficulties 
Address longer-term 
balance of payments  
difficulties 
Meet very short-term large 
scale financing needs 
Typical 
length 
12 to 18 months  3 years  Funds will be committed 
for up to one year 
Access 
limits 
Normally 100% of quota 
annually and 300% 
cumulatively although 
greater access may be 
allowed in certain 
circumstances 





within 2¼ to 4 years 
unless extended 
Normally expected 
within 4½ to 7 years 
unless extended 
Normally expected within 
1 to 1½ years but may be 
extended up to 1 year 
Charges  Surcharges of 100bp 
above basic rate of 
charge for credit over 
200% quota and 200bp 
for credit over 300% of 
quota 
As for SBA  Surcharge of 300bp above 
basic rate of charge in first 
year from date of drawing. 
Surcharge increases 
thereafter by 50bp every 
six months up to 500bp. 
Source: IMF website (www.imf.org). 
(a) Other IMF facilities are: 
  Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) to assist low-income countries;  
  Contingent Credit Lines (CCL) which aim to provide financing to prevent crises (it has yet to be used);  
  Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) to help countries experiencing shortfalls in export earnings and services receipts 
 that are temporary and arise from events beyond the members’ control; 
  Emergency assistance for countries experiencing natural disasters or recovering from conflict. 
A.2. Systemic index
Our quarterly ‘systemic index’ consists of three sub-indices representing:
• The country’s international debt securities for all types of issuer relative to
the total for all developing countries (BIS data);
35• BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims on the country relative to total such
claims on all developing countries (BIS data);
• The country’s merchandise trade (exports plus imports) relative to total
world merchandise trade on a rolling four-quarter basis (IMF Direction of
Trade Statistics data). We use total world trade, rather than developing
country trade, to capture spillovers via competition in third markets.27
Each sub-index was calculated by scaling a country’s value relative to the
maximum value in our sample in that year (so the sub-indices are bounded by
zero and one). The three sub-indices were combined with equal weighting to
form the overall index. Table A2 provides the sample period averages for the
components of the sub-indices and for the overall index. For the purposes of the
sensitivity test we also divided the sample into those with high systemic index
(above the median) and those with lower systemic index.
27The BIS foreign claims data is only available on a semiannual basis prior to 1999 Q4 so
linear interpolation is used to produce the quarterly values. Quarterly trade data was also not
available for South Africa prior to 1998 Q4 so linear interpolation from annual data was used.





trade as % of 
world total 
Foreign claims on EME 
as % of total foreign 
claims on developing 
countries 
International debt 
securities  outstanding 




b  0.81 2.21  8.47  15.05 
Korea
b 0.80 2.46  7.99  13.42 
Brazil
b 0.65 0.99  10.10  10.89 
China
b 0.61  3.09  5.63  5.04 
Argentina
b 0.52  0.44  6.20  13.26 
Thailand
b 0.37  1.07  5.43  3.78 
Malaysia
b 0.31  1.37  2.91  3.39 
Indonesia
b 0.30  0.79  4.54  3.38 
Turkey
b 0.26  0.61  2.83  5.00 
India 0.19  0.69  2.70  1.53 
Hungary 0.18  0.39  1.55  4.30 
Philippines 0.17  0.61  1.59  2.80 
South Africa  0.15  0.49  1.93  1.56 
Chile 0.15  0.30  3.09  0.89 
Venezuela 0.13  0.34  1.53  2.34 
Czech 
Republic 
0.11 0.48  1.50  0.51 
Colombia 0.11  0.22  1.55  1.57 
Pakistan 0.05  0.17  0.72  0.19 
Uruguay 0.03  0.05  0.52  0.37 
Memo item:        
Median 0.19  0.61  2.83  3.38 
Sources: BIS, IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and authors’ calculations 
(a)
  Average quarterly values 1995Q1-2001Q4. 
(b) Countries with average systemic index over sample period above median. 
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as per cent of  
quota
as per cent of  
GDP
(c) SDR bn SDR bn
Post-1995
Brazil  2002 SBA with SRF 752% 6.9% 22.8 7.6
Turkey 2002 SBA 1330% 9.5% 12.8 10.4
Brazil 2001 SBA with SRF 400% 3.0% 12.1 11.4
Argentina 2000 SBA with SRF
(e) 800% 7.8% 16.9 9.8
Turkey 1999 SBA with SRF
(f) 1560% 10.5% 15.0 11.7
Brazil 1998 SBA with SRF 600% 2.3% 13.0 9.5
Korea 1997 SBA with SRF 1938% 4.4% 15.5 14.4
Indonesia 1997 SBA 557% 5.2% 8.3 3.7
Thailand 1997 SBA 505% 2.6% 2.9 2.5
Mexico 1995 SBA 688% 6.3% 12.1 8.8
Early 1980s
Argentina  1984 SBA 106% 1.0% 1.2 1.2
Korea 1983 SBA 124% 0.7% 0.6 0.6
Brazil 1983 EFF 528% 3.0% 4.2 2.7
Philippines 1983 SBA 100% 1.0% 0.3 0.1
Argentina 1983 SBA 187% 1.5% 1.5 0.6
Mexico 1983 EFF 425% 2.4% 3.4 2.5
Sources: IMF and IMF World Economic Outlook.
(a) SBA - Stand-By Arrangements; SRF - Supplemental Reserve Facility (introduced from December 1997).
(b) Funds available include augmentations to initial amount announced. 
(c) Relative to GDP in year of initial programme announcement.
(d) Funds drawn under programmes as at 30 April 2003.
(e) SRF approved Jan. 2001.
(f) SRF approved Dec. 2000.







70 75 80 85 90 95 00
Total
Excluding Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico,
Philippines, Russia, Thailand and Turkey
US$ billions
Excluding Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russia, Thailand and Turkey
Source: IMF IFS and authors' calculations.
(a) Average annual purchase from GRA (excluding reserve tranche 
purchases) of those IMF member countries making a purchase in given 
year. Total samples is 172 countries.
38Figure 2: Number of GRA purchases (excluding reserve tranches) and their
























to GDP (RHS) (b)
Per cent of GDP Number of countries
Sources: IMF, IMF World Economic Outlook and authors' calculations.
(a) Purchase from GRA (excluding reserve tranche purchases). Sample is 
those member countries for which purchase and GDP data available.
(b) Sum of purchases of IMF member countries making a purchase in 
given year relative to their total GDP.
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Memo items, 1999 values
a: 




Average external debt, % of GDP   47.3 
(22.1) 
Average total trade, % of GDP   67.1 
(48.1) 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators 2001. 
(a) Standard deviation in brackets. All countries are members of JP Morgan Chase & Co’s Emerging 
 Markets Bond Index Global. 
39Table 3: IMF programmes (SBA, EFF, SRF) announced in sample countries,
1995Q1 to 2001Q4(a)
  Full sample  Countries with average 
systemic index above 
median, N=9
(b) 
Countries with average 
systemic index below 
median, N=10 
  Pre-SRF  Post-SRF  Pre-SRF Post-SRF Pre-SRF  Post-SRF 
Number of programmes           
Total, o/w  10 (2)  14 (3)  4(0)  9 (1)  6 (2)  5 (2) 
SBA  9 (2)  5 (1)  4 (0)  1 (0)  5 (2)  4 (1) 
EFF  1 (0)  4 (2)  0 (0)  3 (1)  1 (0)  1 (1) 
SRF with SBA or EFF  n.a.  5 (0)  n.a.  5 (0)  n.a.  0 (0) 
Amount agreed relative to 
quota 
         
Mean  212% 494% 449%  709%  53%  108% 
Max  688% 1938% 688%  1938%  74%  253% 
Average time to expiration 













Sources: IMF website www.imf.org, IMF International Financial Statistics and authors’ calculations. 
(a) SRF was introduced on 17 December 1997 (Korea’s associated SBA agreed on 4 December 1997 included in post-SRF figures).  
Figures in brackets indicate number of programmes which were undrawn. 
(b) Countries with average quarterly systemic index (1995-2001)  
above the sample median are Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey.  
 
 
Table 4: Endogenous variable: sample summary(a)





per quarter (sample 
average)
(c)
Full sample Pre-SRF 55 0.263 (0.441)




Pre-SRF 26 0.263 (0.442)
Post-SRF 79 0.516 (0.501)
Countries with 
average systemic 
index equal or below 
median
Pre-SRF 29 0.264 (0.443)
Post-SRF 42 0.247 (0.433)
Sources: IMF and authors' calculations.
(a) Pre-SRF period is 1995 Q1 to 1997 Q3; post-SRF period is 1997 Q4 to 2001 Q4.
(b) Defined as a quarter in which a country is in a SBA or EFF programme (with or without SRF ) and makes a 
drawing under that programme at some point before the end of the programme.
(c) Standard deviation in brackets.
40Table 5: Exogenous variables(a)
Variable Definition  Units 
Macroeconomic position:   
INFLATION  Consumer price index inflation  Proportional change yoy of 
rolling average index 
GROWTH  Real GDP growth   Proportional change yoy of 
four quarter rolling sum 
Domestic vulnerabilities:   
CREDIT  Real domestic credit growth  Proportional change yoy of 
four quarter rolling average  
FISCAL  Government fiscal balance relative to GDP  Four quarter rolling fiscal 
balance as proportion of four 
quarter rolling nominal GDP 
External vulnerabilities:   
EXPORT  Growth rate of merchandise exports   Proportional change yoy of 
four quarter rolling sum 
RESERVE 
COVER 
International reserves (excluding gold) to short-term 
BIS external debt 
Ratio 
DEPRECIATION  Dummy equal to 1 if nominal depreciation 
exceeding 5% over previous quarter, 0 otherwise 
Binary variable 
REER  Real effective exchange rate deviation from trend 
(1990-2001 where data available) 
Proportional deviation relative 
to trend  
External liquidity:   
LIQUIDITY  Spread of yield to maturity of Merrill Lynch High 
Yield Master Index over 10 year US Treasury yield 
Percentage points 
Ratings:    
RATING 
(RESIDUAL) 
Residual of OLS regression by country of Moodys 
long-term foreign currency ceiling for bonds and 
notes on all above exogenous variables. Rating 
converted into numerical index (ranging from 1 for 
C rating to 23 for Aaa1). 
 
Sources: JP Morgan Chase & Co, International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook  
database, Thomson Financial Datastream, Moodys, national authorities. 
(a) When underlying quarterly data not available linear interpolation from annual values used.  
41Table 6: Pooled probit estimation: basic model speciﬁcation
Full model Base model
Coeff. Marginal effect Robust s.e.b P |z| Coeff. Marginal effect Robust s.e.b P |z|
at means at means
REERt1 -3.420** -1.090 1.531 0.026 -3.393** -1.114 1.514 0.025
RESERVE COVERt1 -0.706*** -0.225 0.248 0.004 -0.616*** -0.202 0.215 0.004
FISCALt1 -3.810 -1.214 5.482 0.487
GROWTHt1 -3.203 -1.021 2.497 0.200
EXPORTt1 1.911* 0.609 1.110 0.085
INFLATIONt1 -0.093 -0.030 0.182 0.608
DEPRECIATIONt1
a -0.162 -0.050 0.192 0.398
CREDITt1 -1.054 -0.336 1.105 0.340
LIQUIDITYt1 0.056 0.018 0.067 0.402
RATING (RESIDUAL)t1 -0.272*** -0.087 0.081 0.001 -0.270*** -0.089 0.087 0.002
CONSTANT 0.266 0.486 0.585 0.486 0.390 0.213
Observations 532 532
Wald2 47.890 14.330
Degrees of freedom 10 3
Prob2 0.000 0.000
LogLikelihood -263.9 -276.0
cPseudo R2 0.219 0.183
cAdjusted Pseudo R2 0.186 0.171
Accuracyratiod 74.8% 73.7%
Notes:
a Marginal effect is for discrete change of dummyfrom 0 to 1.b Robust standarderrors clusteredonEME.
c McFadden’s Pseudo R2 1  lnL/lnL0 where lnL0 is the log-likelihoodwhenonlyaconstant is included
in the regression.Adjusted Pseudo R2 1  lnL  K/lnL0 where K k 1. dThe proportionof
participationdecisions correctlypredicted. *** indicates significance at 1% confidence level
** indicates significance at 5% confidence level. * indicates significance at 10% confidence level.
42Table 7: Pooled probit estimation: moral hazard test speciﬁcation
Coeff. Marginal effect Robust s.e.b P |z|
at means
Structural effects
 -0.080 0.724 0.912
i,t1 1.004 0.282 1.834 0.584
Marginal change post-SRF
aDt 1.279** 0.316 0.640 0.046
Dti,t1 -1.633 -0.459 2.374 0.491
Sensitivity to fundamentals
k:
REERt1 0.475 0.133 6.141 0.938
RESERVE COVERt1 0.094 0.026 0.435 0.829
RATING(RESIDUAL)t1 -0.837 -0.235 0.525 0.111
k
 :
i,t1 REERt1 -22.419** -6.300 10.752 0.037
i,t1 RESERVE COVERt1 -3.026 -0.850 2.341 0.196
i,t1 RATING (RESIDUAL)t1 0.248 0.700 1.245 0.842
Marginal change post-SRF
k:
Dt REERt1 -0.991 -0.278 6.056 0.870
Dt RESERVE COVERt1 -1.461** -0.410 0.570 0.010
Dt RATING (RESIDUAL)t1 0.950 0.267 0.633 0.133
k
 :
Dt  i,t1 REERt1 18.871* 5.303 10.497 0.072
Dt  i,t1 RESERVE COVERt1 4.528* 1.273 2.710 0.095
Dt  i,t1 RATING (RESIDUAL)t1 -1.014 -0.285 1.370 0.459
Observations 532




cAdjusted Pseudo R2 0.257
Accuracyratiod 77.3%
Notes:
a Marginal effect is for discrete change of dummyfrom0 to 1.b Robust standard errors clustered on EME.
c McFadden’s Pseudo R2 1  lnL/lnL0 where lnL0 is the log-likelihoodwhenonlyaconstant is included
in the regression. Adjusted Pseudo R2 1  lnL  K/lnL0 where K k  1. dThe proportionof
participationdecisions correctlypredicted.
** indicates significance at 5% confidence level.* indicates significance at 10% confidence level.
43